Brian Magierski

The growth of social networking platforms like Facebook may make the group buying concept fly this time around.

Interesting take. The data surely show that M&A typically does not succeed, and I believe the author is right in that many to most deals are done to pad earnings and mask slow growth … although, the intention is more like “to increase earnings and accelerate growth”, which most acquirers believe at the outset.

I’m looking for companies that have a demonstrably good track record with an M&A driven model. I think $JCOM is a potential from word of mouth, and I’m planning to take a look at its model.

Nothing beats a solid R&D engine and true growth markets though … witness Apple.

So, I’m not alone on questioning the fit. Yes it’s accretive and yes Adobe needs growth, but this alone is not a reason to do a deal. The best line from the author was this:

“Most acquisitions make sense right away—with the exception of eBay-Skype and we know how that turned out—but I had trouble wrapping my head around the Adobe-Omniture deal.”

Thomas Ernst Jr from Deutche Bank identified the key success factor at play here:

“The end-game appears to be the ability to combine analytical capabilities into the creative process”

It all comes down to whether Adobe can upsell Omniture’s customer base.

This one feels challenged to explain. Cuts against Adobe DNA, and is a stretch to believe the buyers will connect the analytics with the creative tools. Am I wrong?

Eli Lilly & Co. could benefit from a robust M&A 2.0 process to do a series of small to medium sized acquisitions, using collaborative M&A strategies and tactics to outflank its competitors.

Defensive acquisition by Intuit … small price to pay but a big premium from what appears to be a very early revenue startup. Is there any viable player as innovative as Mint.com left now, or has Intuit captured the only threat?

Congrats to friends at NetQoS! Nice deal and more good news for Austin.

Not surprising given the hindsight. However, anyone paying attention at the time (outside of Microsoft and Yahoo!) should have known that the entire situation was quite a paradox.

Microsoft (the acquirer) should not have been interested in the deal at all, while Yahoo! (the target) should have been grateful for the opportunity to be acquired at that price. Yet, Microsoft tendered the offer and Yahoo! fought hard to reject it, and succeeded.

Now, it is painfully obvious Yahoo!’s rejection was a mistake.

Nice summary of a decade of critical M&A deals and cases